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Students of politics are familiar with two common forms of inﬂuence exercised by
special interests over politicians: the provision of ﬁnancial support to favored candi-
dates during election campaigns, and the application of lobbying power when dealing
with elected politicians. However, in certain political environments, representatives
of special interests — in particular, business owners and managers — choose to run for
oﬃce themselves, rather than simply relying on the political system to protect their
interests. This paper addresses the question of why and in what circumstances busi-
nesses will follow this alternative path of inﬂuence. In so doing, it aims to contribute
to an understanding of the role of institutional environment in determining the nature
of special-interest politics.
Expanding upon existing models of electoral competition and special-interest poli-
tics, we show that two features of weakly institutionalized environments contribute to
the emergence of “businessman candidates.” First, when political parties and other
reputational mechanisms are weak, professional politicians will often be tempted to
renege on promises made during an election campaign. In such an environment, busi-
nesses may prefer to run owners or managers of the ﬁrm for public oﬃce, knowing that
the interests of such individuals will be aligned with those of the ﬁrm after the elec-
tion. Second, when political competition for rents among businesses is large (due to the
absence of checks on arbitrary exercise of political power, and perhaps due to a high
concentration of economic power among businesses), having somebody in oﬃce who
can protect the ﬁrm’s interests is imperative. Coupled with professional politicians’
2commitment problem, this implies the prevalence of businessman candidates.
We illustrate the results of our model by drawing upon the experience of a recent
gubernatorial election in Krasnoyarskii Krai — a large Siberian region dominated by
two industrial interests, with the winner of the election the former general director
of one of the two ﬁrms — which in its particulars exempliﬁes a more general trend in
Russian politics.
31. Introduction
Students of politics are familiar with two common forms of inﬂuence exercised by special
interests over politicians: the provision of ﬁnancial support to favored candidates during
election campaigns, and the application of lobbying power when dealing with elected politi-
cians. However, in certain political environments, representatives of special interests - in
particular, businessmen - may choose to run for oﬃce themselves, rather than simply relying
on the political system to protect their interests. This paper addresses the question of why
and in what circumstances businesses will follow this alternative path of inﬂuence.
The phenomenon of “businessman candidates” ﬁr s tc a u g h to u re y ei np o s t c o m m u n i s t
Russia, where owners or managers of large businesses are increasingly running for public
oﬃce. We present some evidence below of the prevalence of this political strategy in that
country. However, there are numerous examples of similar candidacies in other political-
economic contexts. In Ukraine, for example, a country which shares a number of institutional
characteristics with Russia, large business owners and managers have been elected to par-
liament and mayoral oﬃce.1 Outside of the postcommunist world, Sheehan (1968) reports
that over one ﬁfth of the seats in the early German Reichstag were estate owners, and that
during the 1870s and 1880s businessmen were increasingly drawn into politics. Various
1See, e.g., “Banker Wins Ukrainian By-Election,” Ukrainian Television First Channel (BBC Monitoring),
June 9, 2003; “Ukrainian Paper Proﬁles New Lviv Mayor,” Ukrayina Moloda (BBC Monitoring), April 4,
2003; or “Kyiv Developer Eyes Rada, Council Seats,” Kyiv Post, March 28, 2002. The last story proﬁles an
attempt by a Kyiv real estate developer to capture not only a parliamentary seat through his own candidacy,
but up to 30 seats in the Kyiv city council through the candidacies of employees of his real estate ﬁrm.
4authors (e.g., Bradley and Zald 1965, Pessen 1972, Kipp 1977) have noted that 19th-century
urban mayors and aldermen in the U.S. were disproportionately drawn from the business
elite. In Thailand, “tycoons” dominated party politics in the 1980s (Laothamatas 1988),
while in early 20th-century Chile large landowners typically served in parliament at some
point in their lives (Zeitlin, Neuman, and Ratcliﬀ 1976).
What all of these examples share is an environment that can be thought of as “weakly
institutionalized” in two respects. First, politicians in immature democracies will be more
tempted to renege on campaign promises, as institutional mechanisms such as political parties
which discourage opportunistic behavior by their members (Cox and McCubbins 1994) are
underdeveloped. Consequently, special interests have lesser conﬁdence that promises made
in (perhaps implicit) return for campaign donations will be honored after the election, and
that they won’t be asked to pay again for what they have purchased already. Given this
commitment problem on the part of professional politicians, special interests will be inclined
to lend their support to a candidate whom they know will be supportive after the election —
in the case of a business, to a manager or owner of the ﬁrm.
Second, the identity of an oﬃceholder is typically more critical for business success in
developing and transition countries. Competition for rents among businesses is large (often
due to a high concentration of economic power in the hands of a few ﬁrms), and checks
and balances on arbitrary exercise of political power are weak. Thus, having somebody in
oﬃce who can protect one’s interests is imperative. Coupled with professional politicians’
5commitment problem, this implies the prevalence of businessman candidates.
Our paper follows Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2003) in exploring the political
economics of environments with very weak institutions. In our paper it is weak political
institutions (that do not allow politicians to commit to some policy ex-ante) and weak
economic institutions (that make ﬁrms dependent on the identity of an elected oﬃcial)
that make the appearance of businessman candidates more likely. The willingness of voters
to cast their ballots for such candidates implies that a “stationary bandit” (Olson 1993)
may emerge endogenously in democracies. However, the alignment of the businessman
candidate’s interests with those of his benefactor suggests that society may nonetheless be
worse oﬀ with the bandit inside the castle.
Our model contains elements of two important strands of the electoral-competition liter-
ature. First, in modeling the role of businesses in ﬁnancing candidates (as well as lobbying
elected politicians for preferable policies), this paper builds on previous work on special-
interest politics.2 Second, by focusing on political competition in an environment in which
politicians cannot credibly promise to pursue policies after an election, our model shares an
aﬃnity with models of “citizen candidates” who run for oﬃce in order to implement their
preferred policy (Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997)). In our model,
special interests may choose to nominate and ﬁnancially support “businessman candidates”
2See Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a review of the literature. Our model of campaign ﬁnance builds
especially on Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996), and Persson and Tabellini (2000, section 3.5),
while our model of lobbying follows Grossman and Helpman’s (1994, 1995) appliaction of Bernheim and
Whinston’s (1986) model of common agency to lobbying.
6in order to inﬂuence the outcome of lobbying after an election.
One implication of our formal model is that businessman candidates may be more fre-
quently observed when the industrial concentration of the political unit is “moderately high.”
In a one-company town, it is relatively easy for the ﬁrm to control the politician, since the
politician is unable to extract rents by playing one ﬁrm oﬀ of another. Thus, there is little
incentive to divert a valuable manager from business to politics. Further, when there are
many companies, no one company has a big enough stake to bear the cost of running one
of their own people for oﬃce, and no competing company has a big enough stake to drive
up the cost of bribing the politician. Only when industrial concentration is moderate is
the balance of rents and bargaining power such that ﬁrms will be driven to run their own
candidates for public oﬃce. A further implication is that when voters are inﬂuenced in part
by campaign expenditures, and when one candidate is supported by a local monopoly while
another is backed by a potential entrant, the former will have an electoral advantage. This
follows from a well-known principle in industrial-organization theory: monopolists will often
be willing to spend more to protect their market power than will potential entrants to earn
a share of the rents.
We illustrate the ﬁrst of these two key results by drawing on the experience of a re-
cent gubernatorial election in Krasnoyarskii Krai, a large Siberian region dominated by two
industrial interests. In that election, the competition for rents and inherent commitment
problems characteristic of Russian politics led to a decision by one of the two companies to
7throw its support behind a candidate who had previously served as general director of the
ﬁrm. It was a fortuitous decision: that candidate ultimately won the election, beneﬁting
from substantial ﬁnancial support from a company that presumably knew it could trust him
to protect its interests after the election.
2. The Setup
Consider a game between two businesses, each of which is attempting to inﬂuence government
policy to its beneﬁt. In our model, candidates cannot make binding policy promises during
an election campaign. Rather, policy is chosen after the election, with choice of policy
inﬂuenced by the lobbying strategies of the two businesses. Obviously, the outcome of this
lobbying process may be more favorable to a business if a politician biased in favor of its
interests has won the election. Consequently, each business may attempt to inﬂuence the
outcome of the election through nomination of a “businessman candidate” who will represent
its interests should that candidate win the election, as well as through the distribution of
campaign funds to inﬂuence the outcome of the election. Businessman candidates have
the advantage that they can be expected to act in the interests of the business if elected.
Nonetheless, a business may choose to throw its support behind a professional politician, as
the nomination of a businessman candidate entails an opportunity cost in that a valuable
manager must be “used” on activity which is not directly business-related.
In particular, consider a game with four distinct stages.
8• Nomination stage: Each business decides between supporting a professional politician,
who is not inherently biased for or against either business, and supporting a business-
man candidate, who if elected will act as a perfect agent of the business from which he
emerged. Formally, each business B ∈ {1,2} chooses a candidate kB ∈ {p,b},w h e r e
if kB = b the business incurs an (opportunity) cost of C. Only candidates nominated
by a business may run, so the election will be between candidates k1 and k2.
• Campaign stage: Each business chooses a level of campaign spending in support of its
candidate. As discussed below, campaign spending increases the share of voters who
are biased in favor of a business’s candidate, and thus the probability that candidate
will be elected. Let cB by the level of campaign funds expended by business B in
support of its candidate. (As the business will weakly prefer its own candidate, we
can ignore the theoretical possibility that support may be provided to the opposition
candidate.) Given that funds spent on the political campaign entail an opportunity
cost for the business, a reasonable assumption is that the marginal cost of campaign
expenditures is increasing. For simplicity, let the cost of spending cB in support of
one’s candidate be 1
2 (cB)
2.
• Election stage: Assume a continuum of voters, normalized to mass one, with each
voter either an employee of one of the two businesses or an “unattached” voter. Let
NJ be the mass of voters in group J,w i t hJ =0representing unattached voters and
J ∈ {1,2} representing voters employed by business B. Obviously,
P
J NJ =1 .
9Employed voters have preferences over the business-related policy chosen after the
election by the winner of the election; for simplicity, we assume that unattached voters
are indiﬀerent over these policies. Let vJ(s) be the per-voter utility of an employee of
business J from policy (e.g., subsidy) s, n e to fa n yb r i b e spaid to the elected politician.
Our assumption that unattached voters are indiﬀerent is equivalent to assuming that
v0(s) is independent of s. Since policy will be uniquely determined by the winner of
the election (given each business’s lobbying strategy, which can be anticipated), utility
can be rewritten as vB(kB). Thus, for example, an employee of business 1 can expect
to receive utility of v1(k2) if the candidate supported by business 2 wins.
In addition to policy utility, voters have non-policy-related preferences over the candi-
dates supported by each business. As is standard in the probabilistic-voting literature,
we assume that these preferences have a random component, so that the identity of
the winner of the election cannot be determined before election day.3 In particular,
assume that voter i has an ideological preference for the candidate favored by business
2g i v e nb y :
σi + δ + h(c2 − c1) (2.1)
The term σi is an individual preference for the candidate favored by business 2, with






. Aggregate uncertainty about
voters’ preferences is given by δ, which represents a random preference for the candi-
3See especially Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
10date supported by business 2 shared by all voters, but unknown prior to election day.






. The impact of campaign spend-
ing on voter preferences is captured by h(c2 −c1),w h e r eh is a scalar representing the
eﬀectiveness of campaign spending. We might expect h to be larger, for example,
where voters are less well-informed.
• Lobbying stage: After the election, the governor has to make a policy choice s ∈ S,
where S is a compact subset of RM. If the elected candidate is a representative of
ﬁrm J, he slavishly follows ﬁrm J’s interests, i.e. solves maxs∈S{UJ(s)},w h e r eUJ(s)
is ﬁrm J’s utility from policy s, gross of any bribes.4 If the governor is a professional
politician with his own preferences g(s),t h eﬁrms participate in a lobbying game.
Speciﬁcally, each of the two ﬁrms submits a payment schedule bi : S → R, which
speciﬁes a bribe ﬁrm J would pay for each possible policy choice. The governor than
solves maxs∈S{b1(s)+b2(s)+g(s)}.
3. Equilibrium Analysis
We are interested in subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In this section, we solve the game
by backwards induction: First, we analyze what happens at the lobbying stage. Second,
we examine voter behavior during the election, given voters’ expectations about what will
4In an earlier version of this paper, we explored the possibility that the candidate’s interests might be
only partially aligned with those of his ﬁrm.
11happen at the policy stage. Third, we solve for the optimal allocation of campaign ﬁnance
by each business to its favored candidate. Finally, we consider the decision made by each
ﬁrm as to whether to support a professional politician or ﬁeld a candidate of its own, and
ﬁnd identify equilibria of the game.
3.1. Lobbying Stage
The following technical result provides a description of all subgame perfect Nash equilibria
at the lobbying stage when a professional politician (not businessman) holds public oﬃce.
Lemma 1. (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) (b∗
i(·),s ∗) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
if and only if
(1) s∗ ∈ argmaxs∈S{b∗
1(s)+b∗
2(s)+g(s)}.
(2) for any J, s∗ ∈ argmaxs∈S{UJ(s) − b∗
−J(s)+g(s)}.
(3) for any J, there exists some sj such that b∗
1(sj)+b∗





Though all our qualitative results could be carried through for this general setup, we make
some additional assumptions to simplify the exposition. First, we assume that a professional
politician has no own preferences over policy choice, so that g(s)=0 . Since UJ(s) are
continuous, there exist si be such that si ∈ argmaxs∈S{UJ(s)},J=1 ,2. We normalize
(additively) the game so that U1(s2)=0 . We assume that the sets argmaxs∈S{UJ(s)} are
12singletons.5 Finally, we assume that {s1} ∈ argmaxs∈S{U1(s)+U2(s)}.This implies that
U1(s1) ≥ U2(s2), but this is without any loss of generality.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) deﬁne the notion of a truthful Nash equilibrium for
this kind of game, describe them, and provide arguments as to why these equilibria are
focal at this setting. Basically, truthfulness means that agents’ bribe schedules reﬂect their
preferences over policy choices. With our assumptions, we have the following description of
as u b g a m ep e r f e c tt r u t h ful equilibrium, where VJ(s) refers to ﬁrm J’s utility n e to fb r i b e s
from policy s,a n dVP refers to the politician’s utility from the lobbying game.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique truthful subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
lobbying game when a professional politician is in oﬃce, where agents’ ﬁnal payoﬀsa r e
V1 = U1(s1) − [U2(s2) − U2(s1)],V 2 = U2(s1), and VP = U2(s2) − U2(s1).
Obviously, if the businessman candidate of ﬁrm J has won election, VJ = UJ(sJ) and
V−J =0 . In all that follows, we assume that utility from the lobbying game is spread equally
among all employees of the ﬁrm, so that NJvJ = VJ.
3.2. Election Stage
We can ﬁnd the share of unattached voters who support k1 by referring to voters’ ideological
preferences (2.1): all unattached voters with σi <h (c1−c2)−δ support candidate 1, which
5This is actually not a restriction: it is enough to ﬁx any points in argmaxs∈S{UJ(s)}.






implies that k1 receives proportion
1
2
+[ h(c1 − c2) − δ]
of the votes of unattached voters.
In contrast, employed voters have preferences over both policy and ideology. Focus on a
voter employed by business 1. A voter in that group will vote for the candidate supported
by the business so long as
v1(k1) ≥ v1(k2)+σi + δ + h(c2 − c1)
which given the distribution of σi implies that the share of voters employed by business 1
who support that business’s candidate is:
1
2
+[ v1(k1) − v1(k2)+h(c1 − c2) − δ]
Similarly, the proportion of voters employed by business 2 who support not their candidate
but the candidate oﬀered by business 1 is:
1
2
+[ v2(k1) − v2(k2)+h(c1 − c2) − δ]
Summing across the three groups, and recalling that the proportion of voters in group J







NJ (vJ(k1) − vJ(k2)) + h(c1 − c2) − δ
#
The probability that k1 wins the election is then the probability that this expression is
g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt o1














NJ (vJ(k1) − vJ(k2)) + h(c1 − c2)
#
(3.1)
This expression says that the probability that the candidate supported by business 1
will win is increasing in the degree to which voters employed by business 1 expect to be
better oﬀ if k1 wins the election (weighted by the number of those voters), decreasing in
the degree to which voters employed by business 2 expect to be worse oﬀ if k1 wins the
election (weighted by the number of those voters), and increasing in business 1’s advantage











Expressions (3.1) and (3.2) can be used to derive the optimal level of campaign spending by
each business c1 and c2. Without loss of generality, focus on the problem faced by business
151. Business 1 chooses c1 to maximize the aggregate utility of its employees, which given
that ideological diﬀerences cancel out is equivalent to maximizing the probability-weighted
policy utility from each candidate winning, less the cost of campaign expenditures 1
2 (c1)
2.
Formally, business 1 solves:
max
c1





Plugging in from (3.1) and solving for the ﬁrst-order condition gives:
c
∗
1 = γhN1 [v1 (k1) − v1 (k2)]
Intuitively, this expression says that business 1 will spend more to support its candidate, the
more eﬀective is campaign spending h, the larger are the number of employees employed by
business 1, and the larger the diﬀerence in per-employee utility expected from having k1 win
the election rather than k2.I fﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent between governors k1 and k2, e.g., in the
case of two professional politicians, it does not spend any money in the campaign, c∗
1 =0 .
Similarly, campaign spending by business 2 is:
c
∗
2 = γhN2 [v2 (k2) − v2 (k1)]








NJ (vJ (k1) − vJ (k2)) (3.3)








NJ (vJ(k1) − vJ(k2)), (3.4)
where φ = γ (1 + γh2). Note that this says that the probability that k1 will win the election is
determined by two factors. The ﬁrst, which we will call the direct policy eﬀect,i sd e t e r m i n e d
by the degree to which voters employed by business 1 expect to be better oﬀ if k1 wins
(weighted by the number of voters), less the degree to which voters employed by business 2
expect to be worse oﬀ if k1 wins (weighted by the number of those voters). The second, which
we will refer to as the campaign-ﬁnance eﬀect,r e ﬂects a similar set of considerations, but with
the diﬀerences in utility weighted by the eﬀectiveness of campaign spending. Put diﬀerently,
voters employed by business 1 will be more likely to vote for the candidate nominated by
business 1 both because they recognize that they will be better oﬀ if that candidate wins,
and because the business’s managers recognize that they will be better oﬀ, and consequently
engage in campaign spending to try to ensure that outcome.






NJ (vJ (k1) − vJ (k2)), (3.5)







NJ (uJ (k2) − uJ (k1)).
3.4. Nomination Stage
Recalling that running a businessman candidate entails an opportunity cost C,w ec a nd e r i v e
the condition for business 1 to run a businessman candidate as:
Pr(k1 = b wins | k2)N1 [v1 (k1 = b) − v1 (k2)] ≥ Pr(k1 = p wins | k2)N1 [v1 (k1 = p) − v1 (k2)]+C







NJ [vJ (k1 = b) − vJ (k2)]
#







NJ [vJ (k1 = p) − vJ (k2)]
#
N1 [v1 (k1 = p) − v1 (k2)] + C
18Recalling that vJ(s)= 1
NJVJ (s), i.e. that per-voter utility is gross utility for the group







[VJ (k1 = b) − VJ (k2)]
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[VJ (k1 = p) − VJ (k2)]
#
[V1 (k1 = p) − V1 (k2)] + C







[VJ (k2 = b) − VJ (k1)]
#







[VJ (k2 = p) − VJ (k1)]
#
[V2 (k2 = p) − V2 (k1)] + C
Expressions (3.8) and (3.9) show that there are two classes of eﬀects from supporting a busi-
nessman candidate over a professional politician. First, the utility from winning is weakly
greater with a businessman candidate (V1 (k1 = b) ≥ V1 (k1 = p)), so that for a given prob-
ability of winning, nominating a businessman candidate increases expected utility. Second,
choice of a businessman candidate aﬀects the probability winning through both the direct
policy eﬀect and the campaign-ﬁnance eﬀect, e.g.
P2
J=1 (VJ (k1 = b) − VJ (k2)) is diﬀerent
from
P2
J=1 (VJ (k1 = p) − VJ (k2)).
The following proposition relates ﬁrms’ incentives to nominate and ﬁnance candidates to
the industrial structure. Now that we identiﬁed whether a business will want to nominate
19a businessman candidate, given the choice of candidate by the other business, we must
substitute the utilities from the lobbying game above into (3.8) and (3.9) and ﬁnd the
conditions for diﬀerent combinations of k1 and k2 to exist as equilibria. We further assume
that U2(s1)=0 , which together with our earlier normalization of U1(s2)=0implies that
t h e r ei sc o m p l e t ec o m p e t i t i o nf o rr e n t s-e a c hﬁrm receives no policy utility when the other
ﬁrm’s ideal policy is enacted. The following proposition summarizes the results of this tedious
but straightforward exercise. The proof is relegated to the appendix.






















An equilibrium with ﬁrm 1 only supporting a businessman-candidate against a professional









































2¢2 ≤ C (3.12)
Further, an equilibrium with ﬁrm 2 supporting a businessman-candidate against a profes-







































There will always be an C such that one of the ﬁrst three equilibria will exist, and that
conditions (3.10) through (3.12) fully partition C ∈ [0,∞). In contrast, there will exist
C such that (3.13) is satisﬁed only when U2 (s2) ≥ 3
4U1 (s1),t h a ti s ,ﬁrm 2’s preferred
policy provides it with payoﬀ closed to that of ﬁrm 1. Further, the interval over which
(k1 = p,k2 = b) is an equilibrium is a subset of the interval over which (k1 = b,k2 = p) is an
equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. When the opportunity cost C of nominating a busi-
nessman candidate is suﬃciently low, the unique equilibrium has both businesses supporting
a businessman candidate. For C suﬃciently high, neither business will want to lose a valu-
able manager to politics, so the unique equilibrium has (k1 = p,k2 = p). In between these
two equilibria is an equilibrium in which business 1 but not business 2 supports a business-
man candidate, and possibly (for some smaller interval over C) an equilibrium in which only
business 2 nominates a businessman candidate.
Our main comparative-statics results are expressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. (i) Equilibria in which at least one businessman candidate is nominated
21will be more likely, the larger is the utility received by business 2 from its preferred policy
U2 (s2).
(ii) For a given U2 (s2), the range of values C over which there will exist equilibria in
which one rather than two businessman candidates is nominated is increasing in U1 (s1).
Proof. (i) The equilibrium with (k1 = p,k2 = p) will exist only when 1
2U2 (s2)+φU2 (s2)
2 ≤
C. Clearly, the left-hand side of this expression is increasing in U2 (s2).





















Clearly, the right-hand side of this expression is decreasing in U1 (s1). In contrast, the
equilibrium (k1 = p,k2 = p) will be unique when 1
2U2 (s2)+φU2 (s2)
2 ≤ C, where the left-
hand side of this expression is independent of U1 (s1).
Result (i) says that what matters most for the existence of businessman candidates is
not the value to business 1 of its most preferred policy, but what business 2 is willing to
pay for its most preferred policy. For business 1, this represents the price it must pay to
get s1 when a professional politician has won the election, and thus the rent which it can
capture if it nominates a businessman candidate who then wins the election. In contrast,
since business 2 is smaller, it expects to be outlobbied by business 1 should a professional
politician win the election. Therefore, should business 2 support a businessman candidate
22who subsequently wins and provides s2, that business will be better oﬀ by the full extent
to which it values its preferred policy, U2 (s2). Put diﬀerently, Proposition 3 says that
businessman candidates will be more likely in regions where there is strong competition for
rents among businesses, not in regions dominated by a single enterprise which can expect to
get what it wants regardless of who wins the election. Result (ii) is similarly intuitive: an
increase in U1(s1) makes ﬁrm 2 less willing to support a businessman-candidate, since the
disparity in ex-post beneﬁts (and thus campaign spending) increases.
4. Electing A Stationary Bandit
In this section, we consider the situation when a business is forced to run its representative
instead of supporting a politician in a conventional way out of fear that the policy pursued by
a professional politician will be too anti-business. While this kind of situation is supported
by examples of governor elections in Russia, it is also a much more general phenomenon. One
striking example of such a situation is Venezuela, where the oil monopoly has felt compelled
to run its own candidate against a leftist one.
Speciﬁcally, we drop our assumption that g(s)=0for an elected politician. For example,
let S =[ 0 ,1],a n dl e tﬁrm 1 be the only ﬁrm in the economy. Then s ∈ S can be interpreted
as a tax rate on ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. Then U1(s) is decreasing with respect to s, while g(s), the
utility the elected politician gains from public, is increasing in s. In general, the lobbying-
game equilibrium can be described as follows:
23Proposition 4. In any truthful Nash equilibrium of the lobbying stage, a professional politi-
cian selects s∗ ∈ argmax{U1(s)+g(s)}, and ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ is U1(s∗)−[maxs∈S g(s)−g(s∗)].
So, if the elected oﬃcial is a professional politician, the chosen policy maximizes the joint
payoﬀ of the public, represented by g(s), and the ﬁrm. Also, the ﬁrm has to compensate
the public for the losses incurred as a result of moving the chosen policy from the public’s
ideal point, argmaxs∈S g(s), to the one that maximizes the joint payoﬀ, s∗. In other words,
the ﬁrm has to bribe the politician in order to get a policy more reﬂecting its interests.
Therefore, the higher is the amount of rents the ﬁrm can sustain if its representative is
elected, the more likely a businessman-candidate would appear. Incorporating the payoﬀ of
the lobbying-stage game into the nomination-decision problem, one gets that the ﬁrm opts




























Here we do a simple exercise to relate the industrial structure of the economy to ﬁrms’
incentives to delegate a businessman to politics. Assume an environment characterized by
one large incumbent monopolist (ﬁrm 1), and many small potential entrants. Suppose that
ﬁrm 1 decides whether or not to nominate a businessman, knowing that, if a professional
politician is elected, he will be choosing between a regime s1 with a high level of regulation
(and hence little competition), or s2, where competition is allowed. If s1 is chosen, then
24ﬁrm 1 has a monopoly position in the market. Otherwise, there are M ﬁrms participating
in a Cournot-like competition. Demand is characterized by an inverse demand function,
p(q)=a−bq, and marginal cost of production for each ﬁrm is 0. Then, if there is a monopoly
in the market, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁti se q u a lt oU1 = a2
4b, w h i l ei nt h ec o m p e t i t i v em a r k e t ,t h ep r o ﬁt
of each of M − 1 entrants (and the incumbent ﬁrm) is equal to UJ = a2
b(M+1)2. Suppose that
the incumbent monopoly runs its own candidate against a professional politician that, if
elected, would opt for the competitive regime, e.g. since he cares about social welfare. The
number of votes that the businessman candidate gets is equal to:
1
2
+ N1(v1(b) − v1(p)) +
M X
J=2
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In the above formula, it is assumed that potential entrants share campaign costs equally,
and, more importantly, that they have no ‘common-pool’ problem with respect to campaign
contributions. Nonetheless, a businessman candidate representing potential entrants is im-
possible, since any candidate would be inclined to favor his own ﬁrm over other potential
entrants. The above formula shows, that the more competitive is the market (the higher
is M), the higher are the chances of the incumbent monopoly’s candidate to win, and also
25it is more likely to nominate its own candidate. This eﬀect comes from two sources: First,
the higher is M, the more rents the monopoly loses once the market becomes competitive,
and this allows it to keep more of its own voters. Second, with higher M, the gain for each
of the potential entrants diminishes, and thus its employees are less likely to oppose the

















(M+1)2 for all M ≥ 2, we know that the monopoly is more likely to win than the
opponent, and the lower is the demand elasticity in the market, the higher are the monopoly
candidate’s chances to win. They also increase with h, the importance of money in elections,




j=2 Nj, which might explain why large companies are more likely to be sustained
as monopolies.
The intuition described above may also be applied to the ex-post game: of course, a
monopoly is willing to pay more in bribes to sustain its position than are potential entrants
for a competitive market. However, in the ex-post game, a professional politician may have
other incentives to prefer a competitive market to a monopolistic. Competitive markets
provide many beneﬁts to consumers, i.e. voters, such as lower prices and higher wages. If
g(s1)=0 , and g(s2) > 0, then the monopoly might be unable to overbid potential entrants
ex-post (if a2
4b < a2
b(M+1)2(M − 1) + g(s2)), while nominating a businessman allows it to
26circumvent this problem. The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 5. Suppose that a professional politician, if elected to oﬃce, prefers a compet-
itive market over sustaining a monopoly. In the election campaign, the incumbent monopoly
is more likely to support a businessman-candidate, the more competitive is the market if
competition is allowed, the higher is the elasticity of demand for the product, the higher is
the monopoly’s employment, and the more important is money in the elections.
5. Businessman Candidates in Postcommunist Russia
The model presented above suggests that businessman candidates should be more preva-
lent, the greater the commitment problem for professional politicians, and the greater the
competition for rents among competing ﬁrms. Both conditions are more likely to be met
in postcommunist countries, where political parties are weak, politicians’ time horizons are
short, and competition for rents is intense.
5.1. An Overview
Turovsky (2002) notes that gubernatorial campaigns of 1997-2002 in Russia have witnessed
the ever-increasing involvement of large ﬁrms in local politics.6 Vyasheslav Shtyrev, the
6As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent phenomenon is that many representatives of large Moscow (not local) corporations
have tried, often unsuccessfully, to become regional governors. Perhaps the most notable case of a successful
campaign of this type was the election of Roman Abramovich, a major shareholder of the oil company
Sibneft and aluminum company RusAl, to the governorship of Chukotka. In terms of our model, such
outside businesses may have a very large stake in the outcome of local elections, but a smaller local electoral
base.
27president of diamond producer Alrosa, the only large company in Yakutia, was easily elected
governor in 2000. In Tyumenskaya oblast, there was a ﬁght between several oil and natural
gas companies. TNK, Tyumenskaya Neftyanaya Komapniya, supported the incumbent gov-
ernor, Leonid Roketsky, who was also TNK’s Chairman. His opponent, Sergei Sobyanin, was
supported by Sibneft, Transneft, and Surgutneftegaz. In Evenkiya, the main opponent of
Boris Zolotarev, a vice-president of YUKOS oil company, was supported by another major oil
company, Slavneft. Apparently, it was the Evenk oil ﬁelds contested by both companies that
were at stake. But perhaps the most publicized example of the phenomenon we describe in
this paper took place in Kranoyarskii Krai.
5.2. Krasnoyarskii Krai
Krasnoyarskii Krai is one of the largest Russian regions, both by area and by amount of
natural resources (though only moderately sized in terms of population). The 2002 guberna-
torial election was a special election held to replace the late General Lebed, who was elected
governor in 1998 and was killed in a helicopter crash in early 2002. Though the degree of
dissatisfaction with Lebed in the Krai was high, and all of the major contenders had already
signaled their desire to compete with the incumbent governor in regular elections scheduled
for 2003, the political landscape would have been considerably diﬀerent had Lebed not died
prior to the election. For our analysis, it is important to note that both of the two major con-
tenders were unprepared at the start of campaign, with the rating for Alexander Khlopinin,
28who was ultimately elected governor, hovering around 4 percent.7
There are two main economic actors in Krasnoyarskii Krai.
• Norilsk Nickel is the world’s largest producer of non-ferrous metallurgy. Further, the
company owns or controls a large number of regional enterprises not connected to its
core business. Taxes paid by the company comprise, by various estimates, 50 to 75
percent of total revenues of the regional budget. Norilsk Nickel is the chief asset in the
Interros holding company, a closely held corporation with majority shares owned by
two individuals, Vladimir Potanin and Mikhail Prokhorov.
• Russian Aluminium (RusAl) is the world’s second largest producer of aluminium and
related materials. The group includes Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Factory, Achinsk Alu-
mina Factory, and Krasnoyarsk Hydro Plant (electric power accounts for about 30
percent of aluminium production costs).
The stakes for both large companies, Norilsk Nickel and Russian Aluminium, were high.
First, the winner could expect to pay less taxes to the federal and regional budgets. Second,
the winner would have access to cheap energy (which is crucially important for both busi-
nesses, though more so to RusAl, due to the nature of aluminum production), since regional
energy companies are controlled by the regional government. Thus, competition for rents
7Yorke (2003) and Ivanov (2002) describe the recent political history of Krasnoyarskii Krai, and Petrov
(2000) analyzes the 1996 gubernatorial campaign. Krasnikov (2002) is a major source on the 2002 gubernato-
rial elections. We conducted interviews with managers and media strategists of both the Uss and Khloponin
campaigns, and with major political ﬁgures in Krasnoyarskii Krai.
29was intense.
The ﬁrst major candidate, Alexander Khloponin, had previously served as Norilsk Nickel’s
general director, and is quite possibly the third-largest shareholder of Norilsk Nickel. Khlo-
ponin’s start in politics came when he was elected governor of Taimyr, a semi-autonomous
subunit of Krasnoyarskii Krai dominated by Norilsk Nickel and related businesses. Con-
sistent with our model’s emphasis on the opportunity cost of delegating a key manager to
politics, Khloponin’s departure from top management appears to have had a real cost for the
owners of the company. The search for an eﬀective and reliable replacement for Khloponin
ultimately resulted in top shareholder Mikhail Prokhorov’s being named general director of
Norilsk Nickel, a major diversion from other activities within the Interros empire.
Alexander Uss, Khloponin’s main opponent, is a university professor-turned-politician
who was the speaker of the regional parliament at the time of the campaign. During the
campaign, he was supported by most of the large enterprises in Krasnoyarskii Krai, with
the exception of Norilsk Nickel. In particular, Russian Aluminium was a major ﬁnancial
force behind Uss. However, people close to the Uss campaign complained that although
Russian Aluminium was the major donor of the Uss campaign, the amount of support was
considerably smaller than the budget provided by Norilsk Nickel to its candidate. Consonant
with our basic argument, these sources cited RusAl’s fear that Uss would not keep his
promises once elected governor. Probably for the same reason, Russian Aluminium supported
a number of other candidates (but not Khloponin) in the campaign, though ultimately gave
30the lion’s share of its support to Uss. Krasnikov (2002) also notes that Uss’s supporters
suﬀered from a coordination problem in raising campaign funds — obviously not an issue for
Norilsk Nickel, which essentially supported Khloponin on its own.
In the end, only Norilsk Nickel had a “businessman candidate” in the election. Why
did RusAl not follow a similar strategy a delegating a high-proﬁle manager to the election
campaign? (Other regional elections in Russia clearly demonstrated the ineﬀectiveness of
endorsing a candidate with only a mid-level position in the company. One explanation for
this phenomenon might be that the equilibrium level of support to a mid-level candidate is
much lower than that for a top manager, as the latter’s interests are more aligned with those
of the company.) The short answer seems to be that they simply didn’t have a suﬃciently
attractive candidate at hand. According to a high-ranking oﬃcial in Krasnoyarskii Krai with
whom we spoke, RusAl considered two former top managers of the company, but discovered
through opinion polling that neither was a viable candidate. In contrast, Norilsk Nickel
had been grooming Khloponin for high public oﬃce since his election as governor in the
company’s “pocket province” of Taimyr.
There were two rounds of voting (a second round necessary if none of the candidates
received more than 50 percent of the total vote). In the ﬁrst round, Khloponin received 25.2
percent of the vote (only 12.4 percent in the city of Krasnoyarsk), while Uss received 27.6
percent of the vote (more than 40 percent in the city of Krasnoyarsk). The third and the
fourth candidates got 21.4 and 13.4 percent, respectively. In the second round, Khloponin
31defeated Uss by 48.1 to 41.8 percent of votes. (Voters in Russia are allowed to vote “against
all.”) In Norilsk, the home town of Norilsk Nickel, Khloponin received 84.4 percent (with a
42.6 percent turnout rate, less than the average turnout of 47.2 percent) in the ﬁrst round,
and 91.9 percent (with 55 percent turnout compared to 46.8 percent average turnout) in the
second round.
6. Conclusion
This paper has focused on the incentives of businesses to run owners and managers for
public oﬃce in weakly institutionalized environments. In so doing, it has modeled electoral
competition as a ﬁrst-past-the-post contest, the approach generally taken in the literature
on special-interest politics. But businessman candidates arise in other electoral settings as
well, as evidenced by the overwhelming presence of business owners and managers on party
lists in Russia’s 2003 Duma elections.8 Thus, the analysis in this paper is only partial.
A more complete exploration of the phenomenon addressed here would consider the role of
alternative electoral systems, including proportional-representation voting, on the emergence
of businessman candidates.
More generally, it is our impression that the ways in which special interests exert in-
ﬂuence over the political process have been catalogued much more extensively in advanced
8By one estimate, 20 percent of the candidates on the party lists of ﬁve major parties were linked directly
to big or medium-sized business. “Big Business Will Have Big Voice in Duma,” Moscow Times,N o v e m b e r
13, 2003.
32democratic states than in new or chronically weak democracies. That is unsurprising, but
also ultimately unsatisfying. Thus, in addition to any particular insights oﬀered by the
argument presented above, this paper can be read as a step towards a more complete un-
derstanding of special-interest politics, one that is sensitive to diﬀerences in the underlying
institutional environment.
7. Appendix - Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Recall that we have assumed, without loss of generality, that U1 (S1) ≥ U2 (S2).
As the incentive to nominate a businessman candidate may be diﬀerent for the “big” ﬁrm
than for the “small” ﬁrm (where size refers to gross utility from policy, not necessarily
to employment), we must substitute the utilities from the lobbying game into (3.8) and
(3.9) separately. In either case, we will ﬁnd the value of the expression both when the
other business nominates a businessman candidate, and when the other business supports a
professional politician.
Focus ﬁrst on choice of candidate for business 1 when business 2 is supporting a profes-
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Business 1 receives its favored policy without paying anything, i.e. receives U1 (S1),w h e ni t s
businessman candidate wins the election. When a professional politician wins the election
(whether that politician is supported by business 1 or business 2), it also receives its favored
policy, since it is bigger than business 2. However, it must pay what business 2 would
have been willing to pay for its favored policy, so that business 1’s utility in this case is
U1 (S1) − U2 (S2). As business 2 is supporting a professional politician and is the smaller
of the two businesses, it expects to receive nothing, regardless of who wins and regardless of
t h ec h o i c eo fc a n d i date by business 1.










2¢2 ≥ C (7.3)




























































In principle, four equilibria are possible: a) (k1 = p,k2 = p),b )(k1 = b,k2 = b),c )
(k1 = b,k2 = p),a n dd )(k1 = p,k2 = b). We can use expressions (7.3) through (7.6) to ﬁnd
the conditions under which a given equilibria exists. Thus, for example, (k1 = p,k2 = p)
exists when business 1 would choose a professional politician given that business 2 has done










2¢2 ≤ C (7.7)




















35Note that the ﬁrst of these two constraints is binding, since U1 (S1) ≥ U2 (S2), U2 (S2) ≥
2U2 (S2) − U1 (S1).T h u s , (k1 = p,k2 = p) exists as an equilibrium when 1
2U2 (S2)+
φU2 (S2)








































where the second constraint is binding.































Clearly, this equilibrium will not exist for C suﬃciently low or high. However, the equilib-






























36As U2 (S2)−U1 (S1) <U 2 (S2), there will always be intermediate C such that this condition














































































In contrast to the condition for (k1 = b,k2 = p),t h e r em a yn o te x i s tC such that (7.16) is





Comparing the conditions for all four equilibria produces the statement in Proposition
1.
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40Figure 1:  Existence of Equilibria
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